03/28/2008
Journal of Philosophy, November 2007
Author gives a long review of Donald Davidson's book Truth And Predication. The review is at least three parts: a discussion of Davidson's conception of truth and then a discussion of his view of predication, then a critique of Davidson's views on predication.
Davidson takes Tarski's T-sentences as the basis for his truth theory. Author agrees with Davidson that deflationist positions of truth don't capture quantification and truth is more than extensional. Author proceeds to discuss Davidson's rejection of correspondence theories as misunderstanding such theories and too narrow a view (pg581-3).
In chapter 3 Davidson gives a 'rational reconstruction' of how to arrive at a theory of meaning and belief that adds to the missing parts of Tarski's theory. Author takes this as a re-formulation of Davidson's major contributions to philosophy, yet discusses how confusing Davidson's talk can be. On one hand, it appears people have to be following a semantic rule in order to build a theory of meaning, which is countered by how people actually learn language. It is also countered by evidence of 'perceptual reference' and 'propositional inference' in non-human animals and young children. (pg285-6) On the other, he thinks people just need to behave 'as if' they are conforming to those rules, yet author thinks that such talk isn't what Davidson is committed to. (pg584-5)
The next part of the paper is dealing with Davidson's 'problem of predication', which is the regress argument if predicates are names for properties. (pg586-590) Davidson wants a theory of predication to satisfy 4 criteria: (pg586-7)
1. predication should be connected to truth
2. predication is not explained by trying to associate objects with universals, properties, etc.
3. predication is kept separate from the question of the existence of properties, universals, etc.
4. the solution must allow for predication
Davidson appears to waffle between claiming that having predication refer to properties is unnecessary for it to work, and claiming that understanding predication as reference doesn't complete the understanding of predication. When discussing the regress problem, Davidson is loose with his talk, at least according to the author, who shows ways of avoiding the regress while still referring to properties. "The regress gets started if the syntactic and semantic relations of a predicate are assimilated to those of a singular term." (pg 590)
Author defends types of regress. Regression of explanation is bad, regression (infinity) of objects isn't a theory-killer-- there is no real philosophical problem with having infinite entities. There is a philosophical problem with having an infinite explanationatory scheme (pg592).
Author argues that predication has two parts: first it indicates or refers to properties and second it attributes that it is true of the singular term used in the argument (or place) if the predicate. (pg593-594) Author spends some time defending Frege against Davidson. Author asserts that Frege was wrong to believe that predicates can't be predicated without turning them into singular terms. (pg598-601) It is because predicates play a different semantic role than singular terms do that you don't turn a predicate into a singular term when you apply another predicate to it.
Author criticizes Davidson's concept of reference and 'being-true-of'. For Davidson, these concepts are loose and should be whatever works to get true sentences to be come out as true. Here the only 'primitive' concept is truth. (pg605-6) Author argues that though reference and predication are dependent on truth, truth is 'partially explicated in terms of notions of reference and predication'. (pg607) They help explain how truth is related to truth makers.
3/14/08
Godfrey-Smith, Peter - Conditions for Evolution by Natural Selection
03/14/2008
Journal of Philosophy, Vol 54 No 10 October 2007
A paper involving mathematically technical formulations of the components of evolution by natural selection, this paper has a modes conclusion. The paper aims to clarify the status of the various conditions given for evolution by natural selection (ENS). Some condition sets should be considered summaries, or descriptions of all the various ways change in a population can be considered ENS. Other condition sets give sufficient conditions for ENS, outlining a recipe ENS. These condition sets are idealizations, since they might not capture all of the various cases of ENS. Author's main point is to distinguish between these two and warn against not distinguishing them.
Generally, there are three main components to ENS as given in condition sets:
1. Phenotypic variation
2. Differential fitness
3. Heritability/heredity
Author brings up a number of cases that certain phrasings of ENS don't get right:
Case 1: Culling: no reproduction therefore no heredity, yet there is differential fitness because some organisms die more rapidly than others
Reply: this isn't a case of ENS, at least not yet (pg494)
Case 2: differential reproduction with no differential fitness: organisms reproduce the same amounts, but faster than others
Reply: the standard condition sets of ENS are idealized with discrete generations that don't overlap and reproduce at the same time (pg496)
Author discusses the problems with heredity and heritability mixed with fitness. It appears the two concepts should be kept separate, but differential fitness that is heritable should show up in future generations. Differential fitness itself doesn't suggest heritability-- a certain disposition needs to be present for a population to 'respond' to selection. (pg500) This is supposed to be heritability, and it is has a set of difficulties.
Case 3: 'Biased Inheritance': a heritable trait that improves fitness sometimes is heritable, sometimes not. Overall fitness remains unchanged after a new generation.
Case 4: A heritable trait that also improves fitness doesn't come from parent to child in the right way (pg502)
Replies: tie together fitness with heritability in the recipes of evolution, unfortunately connecting two concepts that we wanted to keep separate.
Author discusses arcane equations that are meant to separate heritability from fitness. (pg506-509) [If anyone thinks I'm going to commit the hours need to understand this, forget it.]
The final problems author brings up is heritability by accident and genetic drift. (pg510) These can be fixed by saying that genuine cases of ENS has a causal link between the phenotypic trait's fitness value and the inheritance of that trait. The problem with 'causal link' is that it is vague and not easily expressed in an equation. Author examines an alternate equation and finds it inadequate.
Journal of Philosophy, Vol 54 No 10 October 2007
A paper involving mathematically technical formulations of the components of evolution by natural selection, this paper has a modes conclusion. The paper aims to clarify the status of the various conditions given for evolution by natural selection (ENS). Some condition sets should be considered summaries, or descriptions of all the various ways change in a population can be considered ENS. Other condition sets give sufficient conditions for ENS, outlining a recipe ENS. These condition sets are idealizations, since they might not capture all of the various cases of ENS. Author's main point is to distinguish between these two and warn against not distinguishing them.
Generally, there are three main components to ENS as given in condition sets:
1. Phenotypic variation
2. Differential fitness
3. Heritability/heredity
Author brings up a number of cases that certain phrasings of ENS don't get right:
Case 1: Culling: no reproduction therefore no heredity, yet there is differential fitness because some organisms die more rapidly than others
Reply: this isn't a case of ENS, at least not yet (pg494)
Case 2: differential reproduction with no differential fitness: organisms reproduce the same amounts, but faster than others
Reply: the standard condition sets of ENS are idealized with discrete generations that don't overlap and reproduce at the same time (pg496)
Author discusses the problems with heredity and heritability mixed with fitness. It appears the two concepts should be kept separate, but differential fitness that is heritable should show up in future generations. Differential fitness itself doesn't suggest heritability-- a certain disposition needs to be present for a population to 'respond' to selection. (pg500) This is supposed to be heritability, and it is has a set of difficulties.
Case 3: 'Biased Inheritance': a heritable trait that improves fitness sometimes is heritable, sometimes not. Overall fitness remains unchanged after a new generation.
Case 4: A heritable trait that also improves fitness doesn't come from parent to child in the right way (pg502)
Replies: tie together fitness with heritability in the recipes of evolution, unfortunately connecting two concepts that we wanted to keep separate.
Author discusses arcane equations that are meant to separate heritability from fitness. (pg506-509) [If anyone thinks I'm going to commit the hours need to understand this, forget it.]
The final problems author brings up is heritability by accident and genetic drift. (pg510) These can be fixed by saying that genuine cases of ENS has a causal link between the phenotypic trait's fitness value and the inheritance of that trait. The problem with 'causal link' is that it is vague and not easily expressed in an equation. Author examines an alternate equation and finds it inadequate.
3/7/08
Klein, Colin - An Imperative Theory of Pain
03/07/2008
Journal of Philosophy, Oct 2007
Author begins with discussing the problems with pain for intentionalism, which is the theory that the mental qualities of a thought are exhausted by its intentional content. The problem with pain is that its representational content seems to be a small part of the qualitative aspect of pain that we feel. Thus there have been theories that take pains as primitive, or those that take them as jointly (representational) intentional and also primitive. Author proposes that pains are intentional, just that the content is an imperative, not a representation.
There are some good examples of imperative sensations, or sensations with imperative content, for instance hunger, sleepiness, itching. These are usually positive-- that is, requiring that the subject do something. They also don't particularly represent the world a certain way, author claims. (pg519) Author puts forth pains as imperatives in the negative sense-- to avoid doing the thing that causes pain. He makes two 'notes': the first is that common locutions say that there are pains in places. Instead, it would be more apt to say there are pains when one does things. Secondly, pains are usually received when 'moving in the world', not being 'static and idle'. (pg521-2). Author's last claim is that the imperative account is all 'there is to say about pain'. (pg522)
Author then discusses two objections to the imperative account of pain.
Objection 1: Pain is a report of tissue damage in the body. Author calls this a myth and points out that the imperative account gives indirect evidence for tissue damage, and that is all that is necessary. Author has 3 replies:
1) Pain often comes without tissue damage (pg523)
2) Pain often is unreliable when reporting tissue damage (pg524)
3) Pain as information would fail as a protective mechanism (pg525-6) This is because information can be used and interpreted in all varieties of ways, while pain needs to be a command against all sorts of actions.
Objection 2: Morphine Pain
There are many cases of people reporting feeling pain but also 'not minding it', or quite content with it. This threatens the imperative theory because if you don't feel the imperative, you shouldn't feel the pain. Author points out that such patients are unmotivated by any imperative, not just those of pain. (pg529) Author draws a distinction:
Primary affect of pain: immediate unpleasantness of pain
Secondary affect of pain: emotional responses evoked by pain, like anxiety, concern, etc.
Author proposes that morphine eliminates the secondary affect, but not the primary, and that both have different imperatives. The secondary is more complex, while the primary is usually just avoidance of the kinds of things that cause the pain. The prediction is that morphine patients, then, would avoid those kinds of things but without the usually care and concern. Author claims that this is confirmed in observation. (pg 529-30)
Author concludes by discussing open areas of discussion: general pain not associated with action: headache, menstrual pain, etc. Also the qualitative differences in pains: sharp, dull, shooting. Another open area is psychological and emotional pain. Another is attention and pain-- the relationship and powers they have over each other.
Journal of Philosophy, Oct 2007
Author begins with discussing the problems with pain for intentionalism, which is the theory that the mental qualities of a thought are exhausted by its intentional content. The problem with pain is that its representational content seems to be a small part of the qualitative aspect of pain that we feel. Thus there have been theories that take pains as primitive, or those that take them as jointly (representational) intentional and also primitive. Author proposes that pains are intentional, just that the content is an imperative, not a representation.
There are some good examples of imperative sensations, or sensations with imperative content, for instance hunger, sleepiness, itching. These are usually positive-- that is, requiring that the subject do something. They also don't particularly represent the world a certain way, author claims. (pg519) Author puts forth pains as imperatives in the negative sense-- to avoid doing the thing that causes pain. He makes two 'notes': the first is that common locutions say that there are pains in places. Instead, it would be more apt to say there are pains when one does things. Secondly, pains are usually received when 'moving in the world', not being 'static and idle'. (pg521-2). Author's last claim is that the imperative account is all 'there is to say about pain'. (pg522)
Author then discusses two objections to the imperative account of pain.
Objection 1: Pain is a report of tissue damage in the body. Author calls this a myth and points out that the imperative account gives indirect evidence for tissue damage, and that is all that is necessary. Author has 3 replies:
1) Pain often comes without tissue damage (pg523)
2) Pain often is unreliable when reporting tissue damage (pg524)
3) Pain as information would fail as a protective mechanism (pg525-6) This is because information can be used and interpreted in all varieties of ways, while pain needs to be a command against all sorts of actions.
Objection 2: Morphine Pain
There are many cases of people reporting feeling pain but also 'not minding it', or quite content with it. This threatens the imperative theory because if you don't feel the imperative, you shouldn't feel the pain. Author points out that such patients are unmotivated by any imperative, not just those of pain. (pg529) Author draws a distinction:
Primary affect of pain: immediate unpleasantness of pain
Secondary affect of pain: emotional responses evoked by pain, like anxiety, concern, etc.
Author proposes that morphine eliminates the secondary affect, but not the primary, and that both have different imperatives. The secondary is more complex, while the primary is usually just avoidance of the kinds of things that cause the pain. The prediction is that morphine patients, then, would avoid those kinds of things but without the usually care and concern. Author claims that this is confirmed in observation. (pg 529-30)
Author concludes by discussing open areas of discussion: general pain not associated with action: headache, menstrual pain, etc. Also the qualitative differences in pains: sharp, dull, shooting. Another open area is psychological and emotional pain. Another is attention and pain-- the relationship and powers they have over each other.
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