MacDonald, Cynthia & Graham - The Metaphysics of Mental Causation

07/27/2007

The Journal of Philosophy, Vol CII, No 11, November 2006

This is a difficult (and long) paper about the causal efficacy and causal relevance of mental events. The causal efficacy of an event is a necessary condition for the causal relevance of one of the event's properties. The issue here is that there seem to be two causes that are causally efficacious for the same effect, e.g. turning on a light 'because you noticed it was cold' or 'because of some neuro-physical explanation'. Here is the 'qua problem' of non-reductive monism. Notice that if you can/want to reduce the mental to the physical, this isn't a concern. But if you believe the mental can't be reduced, then you have a case, made especially by Kim, that mental properties are 'too little' relevance for effects. This calls for a defense of the mental in conjunction with 'minimal physicalism', which makes the case for the irreducibility of the mental. The problem goes as follows:

PCR: physical properties of physical events are causally relevant to the physical effects of those events

MCR: Mental properties of physical events are causally relevant to some of the mental and physical effects of those events

EXCL: If P is causally sufficient for an effect, there is no other property Q that is distinct from and independent of P, that is causally relevant for that same effect

CLOS: If a physical event has a cause, it has a sufficient physical cause, where physical Ps are causally sufficient for the effect

Put all these together and it seems we have physical properties being causally relevant for physical effects, and the mental properties being 'too little' to be included. (pg546) Yet for the causal efficacy of mental events, you should be able to preserve all these 4 principles.

One possible fix for the causal efficacy of events is a trope theory. Tropes are abstract and not concrete, but this distinction doesn't map onto a universal/particular distinction. (pg547) Instead, a trope of red is the unique red of a certain robin (at a certain time and place), an abstract gained from attending to just one aspect of the robin. The concrete robin is all the tropes taken together. Under the trope theory, there are two conceptions of what it is to be a property. The first considered is the 'class of tropes' theory, where a property is all tropes of red taken together. (pg548) The second is that a property is just another trope. Authors consider the 'class of tropes' conception of properties first in their analysis of whether the trope theory solves the problem of mental efficacy.

The setup is that physical tropes (that are causally relevant) fit into a class of similar tropes to form a homogeneous property. A mental property is a higher-level (not 'higher-order') property that contains classes of these same physical tropes, and other physical tropes that instantiate the same trope-functional mental trope, e.g. pain is c-fibers and/or h-fibers and/or o-fibers... (pg550-1) Since the physical trope that is causally relevant falls into both a physical property and a mental property, the problem looks solvable. However, authors throw up the following objections: if a physical trope is causally relevant, in virtue of what? Prima facie, it seems relevant because it is a physical property, not because it is also a mental one. (pg552) Secondly, just because you call a higher-level property 'mental' doesn't make it mental-- there are lots of higher-level properties that are also physical. (pg553) Finally, authors claim that logically there is no connection between a causally relevant physical trope that is a physical property and a mental property, even if that causally relevant physical trope also inhabits that mental class. After all, there are several other heterogeneous classes which that physical trope will also inhabit that should not be considered causally relevant. (pg553-4)

A way out for the trope theorist is to claim not that properties are classes of tropes but instead just the tropes within the classes. (pg554) Authors attribute this view to Heil & Robb. Here is where authors level their biggest objection: the trope theorist misses the point of causal relevance: it isn't that a P property and an M property are identical therefore both relevant; causal relevance is the problem of: what is effected in virtue of what property? (pg555) This problem authors claim the trope theorist fails to address. Instead, authors offer up the Property Exemplification Account (PEA). PEA says that events like having a pain right now not only has the property of 'being a pain event' but also is an exemplifying of a property like 'has-pain'. (pg556). Here's how it works: objects are the subjects of events. In objects, property exemplifyings occur. When a property is an exemplifying in an event, it is actually exemplifying in the subject. A property exemplifying in a subject at a time is constitutive of an event, (pg556-7) though does not 'constitute' the event the same way e.g. a chair parts constitute a chair. (pg559)

Authors then posit that not only do events have constitutive properties (the properties of the objects), but events also have 'characterizing properties' as well. Characterizing properties have exemplifyings in events, and constitutive properties have exemplifyings in objects, the subjects of those events. (pg560) This sets up two sets of properties that an event can have. Kim argues that mind-body identity in events must be between constitutive properties of events, but authors consider instead that the identity should be between the properties of the events, not of their objects (subjects).

From here authors elaborate what a property is according to the PEA, and claim that two distinct properties can have exemplifyings in the same object of an event. In this case, you can have a mental property and a physical property exemplify in the same object of an event. They claim the mental-physical co-instantiation is a supervenience relation that is similar to the metaphysical relation between 'being colored' and 'being red' (pg561). So mental properties and physical ones are both exemplified in the same subject in the same event. Authors then argue that the 'universalist understanding' of properties forces the causal efficacy of mental events, since when a mental property is exemplified in an object of a physical event, that event is constitutively a mental event as well.(pg562) The result is that all properties that are exemplified in the subject of an event become efficacious. The immediate objection arises: too many properties are efficacious! Authors argue that this isn't a problem-- the only problem is if too many properties are causally relevant. (pg563)

To save causal relevance from this objection, authors introduce another thesis that works off the 'is colored'/'is red' relation by talking about different levels of mental and physical properties. Mental properties are 'higher-level' than their lower-level physical ones, but related in that when the lower-level one is exemplified, the higher-level one automatically is. Authors call this the Property-Dependence thesis (pg564). Crucial to this is understanding that a mental property of 'thinking of Vienna' is a higher-level property of 'neuro-state x'. The causal relevance of the lower-level physical property then can become the causal relevance of the higher-level mental one of the same object in the same event. Yet not every property becomes causally relevant (though every one could be considered causally efficacious) since not every property of the object is a higher-level property of the lower-level, causally relevant physical property. Lastly, mental properties aren't considered constitutive to the event (I guess they are part of the 'characterizing properties' of the event). This is a supervenience relation that authors analyze (pg565).

The next step is to show that mental properties can be causally relevant qua mental properties, not because they supervene on causally relevant physical ones. Authors claim that the framing of this problem by Kim is hostile to this possibility, so if they can show that the causal relevance of the mental no more problematic than any other causal relevance claim, they have done enough (pg567). At this point they draw the distinction between property instances and properties themselves. Causal efficacy is about property instances; causal relevance is about the properties themselves (that are instanced in objects of events). This distinction serves to show that there can be many physical properties being instanced in an event that will not be causally relevant to some of the effects. Authors claim this is a by-product of having a metaphysics that allows for multiple properties to be exemplified in the same event. In other words, there are some properties being relevant to some effects, other properties relevant to other effects, and so on. So it isn't just mental properties but also other physical ones that may fail to be causally relevant (for a particular effect property exemplifying). Given that this is context-dependent and empirical, authors insist it would be 'churlish' to reject the mental. (pg568)

The last objection is one that claims that Davidson's Principle of the Nomological Character of Causality (PNCC), combined with the position that the mental is anomalous (the mental doesn't figure in causal laws), makes mental property relevance impossible. (pg571) Authors first argue that PNCC isn't the only enduring causal theory, and that proposals from the likes of Lewis have suggested co-variance as a theory of causation. (pg572) These new propoals remove the 'covering-law' as necessary for causation, therefore still leaving open the possibility of mental property relevance along with physical property relevance. The lesson here is that 'overdetermination has to do with causal instances-- efficacy, not relevance' (pg574) Authors argue that two 'co-variation relationships' (causally relvant properties) can exist 'harmoniously'.

Haldane, John - The Breakdown of Contemporary Philosophy of Mind

07/20/2007

Mind, Metaphysics and Value, ed. J. Haldane, 2002

This is a self-contained chapter in a collection that tries to recapture some of the ancient theories (Aristotle & Acquinas) that grappled with the mind-body problem. As the problem became different with Descartes, part of what it means to use ancient theories is to change what the problem is in the first place. The first part of the paper is devoted to author comparing what the scholastic philosophy world was like just before Descartes to what our current anglo-analytic philosophy world is like, suggesting that there is about to be a major revolution that will sweep all this work away as irrelevant, or at least outdated.

Author continues to stress how we need a different approach to the mind-body problem altogether. One example is to focus on the non-representational forms of intentionality, using quotes from Merleau-Ponty and Anscombe that talk about immediate, unmediated practical knowledge that the mind acquires from the world. (pg 57-8) To make his point that current understandings are in need of overhaul, author points to the following problems:

-- The problem of eliminitivism: the unwelcome conclusion that denies mental content/experience
-- The problem of supervenience: the unwelcome conclusion that asserts some kind of connection between the mental and the physical, but fails to capture how (the problem given to the non-reductive physicalist)
--The problem of dualism: the unwelcome conclusion that separates the mind from the body in all important ways

With these three problems put in this way, it isn't clear how we're going to get out of it using our current reasoning. Author assumes that eliminitivism is a bad conclusion, as is mentalism. Author focuses on the problem of supervenience/dependence. What is the nature of this relation? The Davidsonian reply is weak: you can't have a change in the mental without a change in the physical, and vice verse (then add an asymmetry that favors the physical as the primary causal source). (This doesn't go as far as type-type or token-token identity.) The problem here is that any change in the physical (in any part of the world) could account for a change in my mental state, a sort of 'global supervenience' that is absurd.

In the next discussion, we have a potential fix that tries to use perceptual externalism. The problem is that we don't have a good world-mind connection, so why don't we just say that part of what is in the mind is the things that are in the world? (pg 62) Author thinks this fails because of the problems of genuine mental causation. The first problem of genuine mental causation is basically the same as the earlier problems: are there two distinct processes, one (non-identical) process, or what? (pg 64-5) The second problem is that it seems as though the physical systems are doing all the causal 'work', with the mental is an epiphenomenal, or byproduct of the physical. (pg 65-7)

Author turns to three possible arguments from Acquinas, two of which he would like to see revitalized. (pg 72) These are as follows:
2) Human reasoning uses not empirical particulars but abstract universals, which don't 'exist' per se
3) Thinking is self-reflexive: when I am thinking, I know I am thinking-- but not as a second-order thought but instead as part of the original thought.

Author thinks that pursuing these lines of argument might be fruitful.

Arnold, Jack & Shapiro, Stewart - Where in the (World Wide) Web of Belief is the Law of Non-contradiction?

07/13/2007

Nous, Vol 4 Issue 2, 2007

This is a paper that tries establish that there are two interpretations of Quine, or perhaps more accurately, that Quine was of two minds when it came to the status of logical truths. Authors believe there was a 'logic-friendly' Quinean empiricism, one that placed the rules of truth-preserving inference (logic) outside of the possibility of revision by recalcitrant experience. There was also 'radical' Quinean empiricism, dating back to 'Two Dogmas', that did not exclude any of the rules of logic from possible revision. This is a concern because it could mean that the law of non-contradiction and 'ex falso quodlibet' (explosion) are subject to revision. Because authors are classical logicians, this is troubling to them. Authors first lay out the possible conflict between the logic-friendly Quine and the radical Quine, but then mostly focus on the implications for the radical Quine. The thesis for the paper is that if we are to take these rules of logic on using the radical Quine's own principles of empirical confirmation, these rules will not have the robust status of universal rationality that many (most) logicians want them to have.

The first part of the paper entails the authors go to the original sources often and trying to work out the radical Quine's theory (pg 279-281). Ultimately the authors conclude that it is part of Quine's holism that logic is included in the 'web' of beliefs. It just so happens that the 'theories' of logic go very far to the inside of the web, making recalcitrant experience more likely to change beliefs on the edges rather than closer to the insides. This is complicated by other claims made by Quine that seem to say that logic cannot be changed since, any change in logic is a 'change of subject'. This is Quine's reply to dialetheists-- 'you're just changing the subject'. So, is a change in the theory of logic change the meaning of the theory? Quine says yes. (pg 280-281) Now we might be left to wonder how theories of logic could be changed at all without changing everything altogether.

The next matter for consideration is how the rules of logic should be used within the web of belief. Should they be used everywhere? One problem here is that Quine does not like to engage with normativity when discussing belief. Talk of 'should' would mean that the rules of logic have some sort of force other than merely helping to make predictions and avoid recalcitrant experience. Authors interpret Quine as talking about using causation (or constant conjunction) for belief formation and ordering (pg 283-4), not using normative logical rules.

Lastly, we have a problem of what 'recalcitrant experience' really is. Does it mean there are contradictions between one belief and another? If so, then it appears the law of non-contradiction has some priority and is immune from alteration. The authors use the same talk of data causing assent to Belief A, and they previously would have assented Belief ~A, which is impossible to do. No real talk of contradictions, just of beliefs that cannot be taken together because they are impossible. (pg 285-286)

The second portion of the paper involves using only a descriptive picture of the realm of science and the realm of ordinary every-day beliefs in discovering the status of the law of non-contradiction and explosion. Authors look at two 'chunks' of belief: everyday beliefs, and scientific theories. In both cases, authors argue that the law of non-contradiction applies in some areas and not in others, and that (in the case of everyday beliefs) humans have a 'knack' for intuiting where to apply it and where not to, and that (in the case of science) often we are willing to accept contradictions as long as we get the predictions right (pg 286-292). The case for explosion (ex falso quodlibet) is even worse. There is no widespread acceptance of this in everyday usage or even in science.

The last part of the paper discusses that we are left with. The only hope of establishing a robust notion of the law of non-contradiction is to assert it's epistemic usefulness. Certainly it fits into a logical system (classical logic) that is disciplined, consistent and orderly. But so is a paraconsistent system! This does not save the law of non-contradiction. (pg 292-293) Lastly, we might hope that the Minimum Mutilation Thesis preserves the truths of logic. Unfortunately, this seems consistent with paraconsistent/dialetheists as well.

Blankenhorn, David - Ch 6 Deinstitutionalize Marriage?

07/06/2007

The Future of Marriage, Encounter Books, 2007

In this chapter author discusses what it means to deinstitutionalize marriage, and why he thinks SSM is going to do that. Author starts by discussing the claims of Jonathan Rauch, who thinks that SSM will actually strengthen marriage. Author criticizes this 'dream' as using a purile definition or conception of marriage, one that is essentially private. Author then moves on to citing various leftist activists who are generally against traditional marriage but very much in favor of SSM.

After reciting a bunch of leftist writers who want to transform marriage and favor SSM for that very reason, author presents his main claim about the leftist thinkers; there are those who:
1) think marriage is a good thing and gays deserve to be brought in
2) think marriage is a bad thing and why not bring gays into it
3) think marriage is a bad thing and SSM will help to transform it

Author claims that we need to get clear about the fundamentals of marriage-- what it is for, what it is essentially about-- so that we can get clear on it's public meanings. The real fight here is about the public meaning of marriage, because that is what the 'institution' of marriage really is-- what public meanings it has. Author claims that the arguments often used to support SSM talk about what marriage is fundamentally about, and these miss the point. (#1-5 on pg 139-140). Author claims that the definitions/conceptions of marriage used in these pro-SSM arguments are mainly about supporting 'close personal relationships', not marriage-- and there is a big difference between the two things.

Next are five claims that 'disconnect' the traditionalist view of marriage from what marriage is now. (#6-10 on pg 139-140) Author likens these to 'turning off the lights until it is dark enough to suit us' (pg 150), referring to taking out of the conception of marriage the following: monogamous sex, bridging the male-female divide, raising biological children with a mother and father, and having a 'natural parent'.

Lastly, author wants to reply to various leftist objections to marriage a religious institution: marriage came about before religion in any modern sense of the word. Also, author points out that some claim that marriage as an institution has become weaker, making it a reason to allow SSM. Author sees this as totally backward-- that if it is only a weakened institution of marriage that will accept SSM, we should strengthen marriage and then, of course, this would exclude SSM. Many of author's conclusion end with a dilemma-- choose SSM and the various ideas that support and go along with it, or go with the other choice, a pro-marriage as a robust institution, anti-SSM package. "We must choose".