12/15/2006
Presidential Address
The Jerry Fodor Over-used Latin Glossary:
Mutatis Mutandis: 'with the necessary changes having been made'
Ipso Facto: 'by the fact itself'
A Fortiori: 'from the stronger reason'
Ceteris Paribus: 'all else being equal'
Inter Alia: 'among other things'
Author begins with a review of the 'baptismal' account of fixing the names of natural kinds terms; fixing the referents for names.
1, the word 'water' lacks descriptive content.
2, baptism occurs when the speaker has the intention to name something. The flow of explanation goes from the mental state to the linguistic expression. The way author indicates it goes is as follows: "Let's call this kind of stuff: 'water'.".
3, the name 'water' is a rigid designator for possible worlds (modality), designating the same kind of stuff in all worlds where it exists at all.
Author claims that you need the modal to get necessary a posteriori facts. The modal is underwritten by the baptismal account of naming, since this account of naming designates rigidly and doesn't seek to describe the kind it designates, just designates the kind as 'water'.
Author then claims that the baptism intention can't match up to rigid designation. There are some possibilities:
1. You need the concept of water before you baptize that stuff as 'water'. Author likes this, but nobody else does. This still falls short, because you have to let people know that you're using the concept WATER when you're baptizing water as 'water', so you have to have 'water' be in the language prior to baptizing it as 'water'. Nobody likes this outcome. But as a solution, you have to baptize a natural kind using a representation that doesn't involve a concept. See next...
2. You try to say "this kind of stuff is 'water'." This uses a demonstrative, not a concept to baptize. The new problem, author points out, is that nobody really knows what you're pointing out when you say 'this kind of stuff'. Do you mean the stuff granny uses for brushing teeth? Do you mean the kind of stuff that fills a glass? Each token refers to multiple kinds.
Author considers various 'NP-- Not-Pooh' fixes to this problem and rejects them. He closes with a 'deeper problem' in trying to secure nomological necessity with semantic necessity.
12/15/06
12/8/06
Kim, Jaegwon - The Mind-Body Problem at Century's Turn
12/08/2006
The Future of Philosophy, Brian Leiter, editor. 2004
Author begins with claming that physicalism is close enough to the right answer, and better than substance dualism and property dualism.
Substance dualism: the idea that Cartesian minds of a different substance can act causally on the physical plain cannot be supported. Causation needs spatial relations, or relational properties that can be laid out in space. Space, at least, is the thing that allows us to 'pair' causes with their effects. Author argues that since cartesian minds are non-spatial, we have no possibility of pairing them with spatially allocated items. There is also way that we can think of for non-spatial objects to cause and effect each other, let alone spatial objects.
Property dualism: most famous version of 'nonreductive materialism'. Beliefs, desires, feelings and so on cannot be reduced to the physical. They play a causal role. But how, author questions? Brings same arguments to bear, since now we're wondering how beliefs and desires move our physical bodies to do anything at all.
"If mentality is to have any causal efficacy at all-- it must be physically reducible" pg 138.
Mental Residue: Inverted qualia is a genuine possibility. Author concedes that the nature of qualia might be non-reducible, but also, luckily, causally impotent. The similarities and differences between qualia ought to be causally potent, and also reducible, but the feel and nature of this or that quale cannot be explained.
The subjective is the first-personal aspect of the mind, and is currently incompatible with the reductive program. The cogito 'I exist' is not the same proposition as 'Descartes exists', or 'that man exists', and so on. The special status of this proposition [is it a proposition?] and the privileged access we have to our mentality is lost on reduction, and is different from the mind-body problem, but needs attention. Review pg 149.
The Future of Philosophy, Brian Leiter, editor. 2004
Author begins with claming that physicalism is close enough to the right answer, and better than substance dualism and property dualism.
Substance dualism: the idea that Cartesian minds of a different substance can act causally on the physical plain cannot be supported. Causation needs spatial relations, or relational properties that can be laid out in space. Space, at least, is the thing that allows us to 'pair' causes with their effects. Author argues that since cartesian minds are non-spatial, we have no possibility of pairing them with spatially allocated items. There is also way that we can think of for non-spatial objects to cause and effect each other, let alone spatial objects.
Property dualism: most famous version of 'nonreductive materialism'. Beliefs, desires, feelings and so on cannot be reduced to the physical. They play a causal role. But how, author questions? Brings same arguments to bear, since now we're wondering how beliefs and desires move our physical bodies to do anything at all.
"If mentality is to have any causal efficacy at all-- it must be physically reducible" pg 138.
Mental Residue: Inverted qualia is a genuine possibility. Author concedes that the nature of qualia might be non-reducible, but also, luckily, causally impotent. The similarities and differences between qualia ought to be causally potent, and also reducible, but the feel and nature of this or that quale cannot be explained.
The subjective is the first-personal aspect of the mind, and is currently incompatible with the reductive program. The cogito 'I exist' is not the same proposition as 'Descartes exists', or 'that man exists', and so on. The special status of this proposition [is it a proposition?] and the privileged access we have to our mentality is lost on reduction, and is different from the mind-body problem, but needs attention. Review pg 149.
12/1/06
Stump, Eleonore - Love, By All Accounts
12/01/2006
Proceedings and Addresses of the APA
Author briefly reviews the three general approaches to the nature of love. The responsiveness account, the volitional account, and the relational account. Each has faults:
Responsiveness account: the features possessed by the beloved are also possessed by others, undercutting the non-substitutivity of love. Also love may alter when the intrinsic features of the beloved alter.
Volitional account: the will to love a the beloved could be equally applied to anyone else, for no good reason one way or another. Example: I do love you, but for no good reason.
Relational account: we value a relationship, a history, a connection, ongoing and interactive-- but Dante doesn't satisfy this account, since he loved Beatrice from afar and also had a wife Gemma Donati, who lived in another town (that he made no efforts to be close to). [This 'Dante Argument' is a poor reply to the relational account.]
Author turns to Thomas Acquinas' account of love, which is two-fold:
1) the desire the objective good of the beloved
2) the desire for union with the beloved
To desire the objective good of the beloved: you don't always know what you're desiring, since it is an objective matter what the good of the beloved is. This could mean that you think you love A, but you actually don't.
'Union' isn't well defined in Acquinas, but author argues that it provides for multiple 'offices of love', because different unions are appropriate due to different relational and intrinsic aspects of the beloved and the lover. Ex: friend, lover, parent. It also makes it possible to abuse an office of love by desiring a union that is outside of the appropriate office. Ex: incest, molesting priests
Self-love means you want to be integrated (union) and that you want the best for yourself.
The claim is that this account responds to much of the difficulties earlier found. The lover can list intrinsic/relational aspects of the beloved that fit into an office of love, and the volitional account is satisfied in spirit, since at it's backbone is the desire for the good of another.
Finally, this can give an account of forgiveness as trying to find an appropriate office of love.
Proceedings and Addresses of the APA
Author briefly reviews the three general approaches to the nature of love. The responsiveness account, the volitional account, and the relational account. Each has faults:
Responsiveness account: the features possessed by the beloved are also possessed by others, undercutting the non-substitutivity of love. Also love may alter when the intrinsic features of the beloved alter.
Volitional account: the will to love a the beloved could be equally applied to anyone else, for no good reason one way or another. Example: I do love you, but for no good reason.
Relational account: we value a relationship, a history, a connection, ongoing and interactive-- but Dante doesn't satisfy this account, since he loved Beatrice from afar and also had a wife Gemma Donati, who lived in another town (that he made no efforts to be close to). [This 'Dante Argument' is a poor reply to the relational account.]
Author turns to Thomas Acquinas' account of love, which is two-fold:
1) the desire the objective good of the beloved
2) the desire for union with the beloved
To desire the objective good of the beloved: you don't always know what you're desiring, since it is an objective matter what the good of the beloved is. This could mean that you think you love A, but you actually don't.
'Union' isn't well defined in Acquinas, but author argues that it provides for multiple 'offices of love', because different unions are appropriate due to different relational and intrinsic aspects of the beloved and the lover. Ex: friend, lover, parent. It also makes it possible to abuse an office of love by desiring a union that is outside of the appropriate office. Ex: incest, molesting priests
Self-love means you want to be integrated (union) and that you want the best for yourself.
The claim is that this account responds to much of the difficulties earlier found. The lover can list intrinsic/relational aspects of the beloved that fit into an office of love, and the volitional account is satisfied in spirit, since at it's backbone is the desire for the good of another.
Finally, this can give an account of forgiveness as trying to find an appropriate office of love.
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