10/24/2014
Comments to Death and the Afterlife, by Samuel Scheffler, Oxford University Press, 2013
Author starts by complimenting Scheffler on an original philosophical thesis, but does not believe that Schffler got the role the afterlife plays "quite right". Firstly, author argues that there are many things that matter to us that are not predicated on an afterlife: Scheffler mentions pleasure, comfort, relief from pain, author adds music and friendship to that list and continues to argue that Scheffler underestimates what we might value independently of an afterlife (pg133-4). Here author argues that the activity, and the conclusion of it, might be worthy pursuits even if there is no future benefit: for instance doing research and trying to find a cure could be worth doing "happily", even though the product may benefit no future person. Author argues that what we might lose is that element of value that is future-oriented, although that might be a good thing, since it would allow us to focus on what value was "intrinsic" rather than instrumental (to a future) (pg135). With this argument, author casts the afterlife as an instrumental value, where future people would benefit (intrinsically) from present work.
The next discussion is speculation about how what we value might change if we had no contemporaries (not future-people, but present people). The idea here is that much of what we care about loses importance when the social element is removed, author concludes that what matters to us "is that there be other people, who are in some way aware of us-- whether those people exist at some point in the future or they exist right now." (pg137). While author grants is that there is a limit to individualism, but he also argues that this does not necessarily limit egoism by implying altruism, or caring about others for their own sake (pg137-8). The extended point is that we care about future humans that share our values, or perhaps if not share them entirely, will appreciate the work done in the past by us for them. Why do we care about this? Author suggests there is an evolutionary reason. Ultimately, author seeks to minimize the significance of Scheffler's conclusion that the elimination of a collective afterlife would diminish our values, much as the elimination of a personal afterlife did not. Lastly, author discusses two elements of Scheffler's work: (1) that it is primarily empirical, resting on conclusions from thought experiments that could be different given data, and (2) that Scheffler's definition of value as being partially believed to be valuable simpliciter, is mistaken. Here he has a quick interesting discussion in what "valuing something" consists (pg140-1).
10/24/14
Wolf, Susan - The Significance of Doomsday
10/24/2014
Comments to Death and the Afterlife, by Samuel Scheffler, Oxford University Press, 2013
Author starts by acknowledging that "our confidence in the continuation of the human race plays an enormous... role in the way we conceive of our activities and understand their value." (pg113) However, author rightly takes a rather humble approach to 'how we would react' under the doomsday scenario, though also admitting she cannot divest how we should act from how we would (pg114-5). More interestingly, author claims that even rampant hedonists (Mike Tyson or Donald Trump) might easily lose interest in their activities and pursuits, though this could possibly be due instead to the social nature of value (pg116-8).
One obvious point is that when facts about the relevance of goals change, those goals are subject to being re-evaluated (pg118), which Scheffler wants to discount as a suitable explanation to the doomsday scenario. Author argues that it seems unlikely, though possible, that artists and scholars would discontinue their work: after all, many just aspire to make some small contribution to the current generation, without considering the afterlife (pg119-120). Author does spend some time questioning Sheffler's conclusions about the drain of meaning in the doomsday scenario (pg120-2), arguing that the care and comfort of others would not cease to be meaningful. Author shares Sheffler's belief, however, that people in the doomsday scenario would not be happy; the difference is that author does think people would have meaningful lives (pg122-3).
Author revisits the Alvey Singer example, the youngster who claims that homework is unimportant since the universe will explode and destroy humanity one day. The certainty of distant doomsday seems not to be the same as the certainty of immanent doomsday, which is a troubling asymmetry for Scheffler because author believes humans are rational (pg125-6). The commentary ends with author reminding us that the belief in an afterlife should give us renewed vigor to care about the future.
Comments to Death and the Afterlife, by Samuel Scheffler, Oxford University Press, 2013
Author starts by acknowledging that "our confidence in the continuation of the human race plays an enormous... role in the way we conceive of our activities and understand their value." (pg113) However, author rightly takes a rather humble approach to 'how we would react' under the doomsday scenario, though also admitting she cannot divest how we should act from how we would (pg114-5). More interestingly, author claims that even rampant hedonists (Mike Tyson or Donald Trump) might easily lose interest in their activities and pursuits, though this could possibly be due instead to the social nature of value (pg116-8).
One obvious point is that when facts about the relevance of goals change, those goals are subject to being re-evaluated (pg118), which Scheffler wants to discount as a suitable explanation to the doomsday scenario. Author argues that it seems unlikely, though possible, that artists and scholars would discontinue their work: after all, many just aspire to make some small contribution to the current generation, without considering the afterlife (pg119-120). Author does spend some time questioning Sheffler's conclusions about the drain of meaning in the doomsday scenario (pg120-2), arguing that the care and comfort of others would not cease to be meaningful. Author shares Sheffler's belief, however, that people in the doomsday scenario would not be happy; the difference is that author does think people would have meaningful lives (pg122-3).
Author revisits the Alvey Singer example, the youngster who claims that homework is unimportant since the universe will explode and destroy humanity one day. The certainty of distant doomsday seems not to be the same as the certainty of immanent doomsday, which is a troubling asymmetry for Scheffler because author believes humans are rational (pg125-6). The commentary ends with author reminding us that the belief in an afterlife should give us renewed vigor to care about the future.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)
